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CASENOTES
State Taxation on the Privilege of Doing Interstate Business: Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady'—Complete Auto Transit, Inc. (Complete
Auto) is a Michigan corporation engaged in the business of transporting
motor vehicles by motor carrier for General Motors Corporation. In April,
1973, Complete Auto sought a refund in state court of taxes assessed by the
State of Mississippi on the gross income derived from Complete Auto's
transporting motor vehicles from Jackson, Mississippi to other points within
the state. 2 The Mississippi statutes under which the assessment was brought
required the collection of "privilege taxes for the privilege of engaging or
continuing in business or doing business" within the state. 3
Complete Auto contended that the state's assessment was a tax on
Complete Auto's privilege of engaging in interstate commerce and that the
tax thus violated the federal commerce clause. 4 The Mississippi lower court
sustained the assessments' and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed.'
The United States Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Mis-
sissippi decision and HELD: A state tax imposed explicitly on the privilege
of engaging in interstate commerce within the state is not a per se violation
of the commerce clause of the federal Constitution.' In reaching this deci-
sion the Court overruled Spector Motor Services, Inc. v. O'Connor 8 which em-
bodied the longstanding per se rule against state taxation of the federal
privilege of doing business in interstate commerce.'
Although Complete Auto's only objection to the Mississippi tax was
grounded in the Spector rule", the Court, in striking down the rule,
nevertheless suggested four criteria by which the Court in future cases
would assess the constitutionality of any state tax on interstate commerce.
According to the Complete Auto Court, a state tax may be applied only to ac-
tivities which have a substantial nexus with the taxing state; the tax assess-
ment must be fairly apportioned to the amount of the taxpayer's business
done within the taxing state; the tax may not discriminate against interstate
commerce vis vis intrastate commerce, and the tax must be fairly related
to the services provided by the state."
The significance of the Complete Auto decision lies in the Court's rejec-
tion of a per se rule, whereby the privilege of doing interstate business was
afforded absolute immunity from state taxation, in favor of the more
pragmatic four-part test. In rejecting this per se approach the Court has
taken a significant conceptual step by permitting the individual states to tax
the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, a privilege which until
now had been considered to be within the exclusive province of the federal
430 U.S. 274 (1977).
A total assessment of $165,151.48 had been paid by Complete Auto. Id. at 277.
2 Miss. CODE ANN. § 10105 (1942) current version at Miss. ConE ANN. § 27-65-13 (1972).
The commerce clause provides that "Congress shall have Power ... To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
5
 The lower court opinion is unreported. 430 U.S. at 277.
330 So. 2d 268, 272 (Miss. 1976).
430 U.S. at 289.
340 U.S. 602 (1951).
Id. at 611,
1 ° 430 U.S. at 278-9, 287.
" Id. at 277-78, 279, 287. See text at notes 55-90 i?!fra.
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government to grant or withhold. As a result the Complete Auto opinion
evinces a movement toward a balancing approach to solving questions of
state taxation of interstate commerce, an approach in line with other recent
cases involving federal-state relationships." The Complete Auto decision thus
reflects the Court's belief' that in order for the federal government and the
states to co-exist within a mature federal system, interstate commerce, as a
practical matter, must "pay its way.""
This note will briefly trace the history of' the Supreme Court's de-
cisions concerning the constitutionality of state taxation of interstate com-
merce. The Court's holding in Complete Auto will then be discussed in light
of this background. Particular attention will be given to the Complete Auto
Court's rejection of the per se approach previously employed by the Court
in determining the validity of state tax statutes alleged to violate the com-
merce clause. Next, the four criteria of the test suggested by the Complete
Auto Court for determining the constitutionality of a state tax statute will be
discussed in the light of their historical and doctrinal underpinnings. Based
on an analysis of these criteria, it will be submitted that the Complete Auto
opinion is consistent not only with the Court's balancing approach to asses-
sing the constitutionality of state regulatory statutes affecting interstate
commerce but also with the Court's recently enunciated view concerning
the respective limits of federal and state constitutional power in general.
I. IMMUNITY OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE FROM STATE TAXATION
The divergent views of the Court in Spector and Complete Auto on the
question whether the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce is a
proper subject for state taxation reflect a longstanding dispute respecting
the proper impact of the commerce clause on state power generally to tax
interstate commerce. The approach taken initially by the Supreme Court
afforded every aspect of interstate commerce absolute immunity from state
taxation." This approach was founded upon a broad view of federal power
under the commerce clause. It was believed that the purpose of the com-
merce clause was to grant Congress the plenary power to regulate and to
protect interstate commerce and therefore by necessary implication the
commerce clause restrained state interference with interstate commerce.
Accordingly, based on the premise that "the power to tax is the power to
destroy,"' 5
 it. was established that the states could not tax any aspect of in-
terstate comrnerce.' 6
"See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail,—U.S.—, 97 S. Ct. 1211 (1977): Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976): National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See also
Note, Constitutional Law–Commerce Clause–The Reaffirmation qf State Sovereignty as a Fundamental
Tenet of Constitutional Federalism–National League or Cities v. Usery, 18 B.C. IND. AND Com. L.
REV. 736 (1976) (hereinafter Constitutional Federalism).
"430 U.S. at 288 n. 15. Justice Clarke apparently coined the phrase "pay its way" in
Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 253, 259 (1919).
14 Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 448-49 (1827), citing McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648
(1888) ("No State has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form ....")
16
 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
16
 The doctrine that the states have no power to tax interstate commerce rests primarily
on Chief Justice Marshall's conception of constitutional federalism in the. landmark 1819 case
of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In McCulloch, Justice Marshall,
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Despite these early dogmatic pronouncements, the Court struggled
with this absolute approach to constitutional federalism and, at times, gave
effect to the states' inherent power to tax activities utilizing state services,
including activities which involved interstate commerce. For example in the
1938 case of Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue" the Court upheld a
state tax on the local publication of a journal with an interstate circulation,
The Court reasoned that a state tax statute should be upheld so long as it
does not create the danger that the same incidents of the tax could be sub-
ject to taxation by other states thereby creating a multiple tax burden on an
interstate operation." This approach was a pragmatic one for it involved
the Court in an examination of the actual economic effects of the taxes."
The Court in Western Live Stock and its immediate progeny2° appar-
ently abandoned the prior concept that any state taxing statute increasing
the cost of interstate commerce was an invalid interference with that com-
merce, following instead the practical philosophy that interstate businesses
should bear their just share of the tax burden." Soon, however, the Court
while acknowledging that states have the authority concurrently with the federal government
to tax business activities, nevertheless construed the commerce clause as mandating to Con-
gress supreme authority over interstate commerce. Id. at 436. One consequence of Marshall's
view of constitutional federalism was the rule that the states were absolutely forbidden to tax
the operations of a federal instrumentality established by Congress pursuant to its commerce
authority. Id. at 436-37. This conclusion, Marshall contended, was a necessary corollary to the
fact that "the power to tax is the power to destroy." Id. at 431.
Later, in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827), a case involving the con-
stitutionality of a Maryland statute requiring all importers and wholesalers of foreign articles
to secure a fifty dollar license, Justice Marshall reasoned that the rationale of McCulloch was
"entirely applicable" to state taxation of private enterprises engaged in interstate commerce.
Id. at 449. Thus, holding the Maryland statute unconstitutional, Justice Marshall stated:
We admit this power (of a State to tax its own citizens on their property within its
territory) to be sacred.... We cannot admit that it may be used so as to obstruct
or defeat (Congress') power to regulate commerce. It has been observed that the
powers remaining with the States may be so exercised as to come in conflict with
those vested in Congress. When this happens, that which is not supreme must
yield to that which is supreme.
Id. at 448.
" 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
" Id. at 255-57. In Western Live Stock Justice Stone explained the distinction between a
tax which merely adds an expense to interstate commerce, and in a sense burdens commerce,
and a tax which is capable of being duplicated by other states:
Local taxes, measured by gross receipts from interstate commerce, have often
been pronounced unconstitutional. The vice characteristic of those which have
been held invalid is that they have placed on the commerce burdens of such a
nature as to be capable, in point of substance, of being imposed or added to with
equal right by every State which the commerce touches, merely because interstate
commerce is being done, so that without the protection of the commerce clause it
would bear cumulative burdens not imposed on local commerce. The multiplica-
tion of state taxes measured by the gross receipts would spell the destruction of
interstate commerce and renew the barriers to interstate trade which it was the
object of the commerce clause to remove.
Id. at 255-56 (citations omitted).
19 See id. at 257-58.
20 see, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167, 179-75 (1939); Gwinn, White
and Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 439 (1939); Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307,
311 (1938).
21
 See, g Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 313 U.S. 604, 612-13 (1938),
citing Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 254-55.
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reverted to a more restrictive approach. In the 1946 case of Freeman v.
Hewitt, 22 the Court ruled that an Indiana sales tax on the out-of-state sale
of securities was per se unconstitutional because it was laid "directly on"
and "on the very processes of " interstate commerce. 25
 This per se ap-
proach which emphasized the form of the tax rather than its economic ef-
fect apparently was grounded in the original conception that the commerce
clause provides absolute immunity for interstate commerce from state taxa-
tion." Thus, the decision in Freeman, when contrasted with Western Live
Stock, is indicative of a tension between the underlying theory that the
commerce clause dictates an absolute immunity of interstate commerce
from state taxation and the policy that interstate commerce must "pay its
way."
The increasing prevalence of this latter policy was reflected in sub-
sequent decisions as the Court began to restrict the per se approach of
Freeman to one which invalidated only those state taxes which taxed the
privilege of doing interstate business. 25 The 1951 case of Spector Motor Ser-
vices, Inc. v. O'Connor" marks the modern pinnacle of this per se approach
by which state taxes were invalidated because of a particular phraseology
rather than because of deleterious effects of the tax on interstate com-
merce. The taxpayer in Spector was a Missouri corporation engaged exclu-
sively in interstate trucking, with some of its shipments either originating or
ending within the State of Connecticut. Connecticut levied on the corpora-
tion a "tax upon its franchise for the privilege of carrying on or doing
business within the state measured by apportioned net income."" The
22 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
"Id. at 253-54, 259. Justice Frankfurter, writing fur the majority, summarized the un-
derlying philosophy of the Court during this period as follows:
The Commerce Clause was not. merely an authorization to Congress to enact laws
for the protection and encouragement of commerce among the States, but by its
own force created an area of trade free from interference by the States. In short,
the Commerce Clause even without implementing legislation by Congress is a
limitation upon the power of the States.... This limitation on State pow-
er ... does not merely forbid a State to single out interstate commerce for hostile
action. A State is also precluded from taking any action which may fairly be
deemed to have the effect of impeding the free flow of trade between States. It is
immaterial that local commerce is subjected to a similar encumbrance.
Id. at 252.
24 See 430 U.S. at 281 n.11.
" See, e.g., Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948). In Memphis Gas, a Delaware
corporation ran a gas pipeline through several states, 135 miles of which was in Mississippi.
Although the corporation did no intrastate commerce in Mississippi, the State of Mississippi
levied a "franchise or excise tax" upon the "value of the capital used, invested or employed in
the exercise of any power, privilege or right enjoyed by fa corporation] within this State."
Miss. CODE ANN. § 9313 (1942). In upholding the tax, the Supreme Court drew a distinction
between a state statute which taxes interstate businesses for "the privilege of doing interstate
business within the State" and one which taxes "the privilege of exercising corporate functions
within the State." While the former tax would be prohibited by the commerce clause, the latter
would suffer no constitutional infirmity. 335 U.S. at 89-93. The Court's emphasis on
phraseology was highlighted by the dissenting opinion in Memphis Gas which maintained that
the tax in question was an unconstitutional "privilege" tax, while at the same time noting that
the state could constitutionally extract the same revenues merely by increasing the valid pro-
perty taxes. Id. at 99-105 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
" 340 U.S. 603 (1951).
" Id. at 603 n.l.
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United States Supreme Court held the tax invalid, stating that any tax on
the "privilege" of doing business is per se unconstitutional if applied
against what is exclusively interstate commerce."
Thus, despite the shift toward a practical approach as evidenced by
Western Live Stock, Spector made it clear that the Court still was prepared to
invalidate a tax solely because the subject of that tax was the privilege of
engaging in interstate commerce, without regard to the practical economic
effects of the tax and with no consideration of the revenue needs of the
taxing state." Apparently, this reaffirmation of the privilege tax immunity
by the Spector Court reflected its perception of the balance of federal and
state power under the commerce clause, for the Court stated its rationale
for the privilege tax immunity as follows:
Taxing power is inherent in sovereign states, yet the states of the
United States have divided their taxing power between the Fed-
eral Government and themselves. They delegated to the United
States the exclusive power to tax the privilege to engage in in-
terstate commerce when they gave Congress the power "To reg-
ulate Commerce among the several States." ... [T]he con-
stitutional separation of the federal and state powers makes it
essential that no State be permitted to exercise, without authority
from Congress, those functions which it has delegated exclusively
to Congress. 3 °
Although the Spector Court had ostensibly reaffirmed the absolute
privilege tax immunity as well as the perception of constitutional federalism
in which it was grounded, the Court quickly proceeded to limit the effec-
tive operation of the Spector rule.3 ' By 1975, the Spector rule had been re-
"/d. at 609-10. See, e.g., Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203,
216-18 (1925); Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555, 562 (1925); Crutcher v. Ken-
tucky. 141 U.S. 47, 57 (1891). The Court in Crutcher explained that the privilege of engaging
in interstate commerce is immune from state taxation because "to carry on interstate com-
merce is not a franchise or a privilege granted by the State; it is a right which every citizen of
the United States is entitled to exercise under the Constitution and laws of the United States".
141 U.S. at 57. But see Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662, 666-67 (1949). In
Interstate Oil the Supreme Court in a plurality opinion upheld the assessment of a tax on the
privilege of transporting oil within the State of Mississippi. Four Justices of the plurality voted
to sustain the tax as a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. 337 U.S. at
666.
" This disregard for practical economic considerations is evident in the following
statement from the Court's opinion:
Neither the amount of the tax nor its computation need be considered by us in
view of our disposition of the case. The objection to its validity does not rest on a
claim that it places an unduly heavy burden on interstate commerce in return for
protection given by the State.
340 U.S. at 607.
"Id. at 608, citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425.37 (1819).
3 ' Compare Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359, 360-69 (1954) (Vir-
ginia statute establishing a tax measured by gross receipts earned in the state and imposed on
interstate express company for privilege of doing business in Virginia held unconstitutional)
with Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434, 435-43 (1959) (re-drafted Vir-
ginia statute levying a "franchise tax" on "intangible property" owned in the state in the form
of "going concern value" also measured by the same gross receipts upheld because its nominal
subject was no longer the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce).
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duced to "a rule of words rather than a rule of substance," 32 as dem-
onstrated by the case of Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle. 33 Colonial Pipeline
was a Delaware Corporation which owned and maintained an interstate
pipeline, a portion of which ran through Louisiana. Although Colonial
Pipeline did no intrastate petroleum business within the state, 34 Louisiana
imposed a franchise tax for "the privilege of carrying on or doing business"
in the state. 35 After Colonial Pipeline succeeded in invalidating the tax in
the state courts as a violation of the Spector rule," the Louisiana Legislature
redrafted the statute to levy the tax on the "qualification to carry on or to
do business within this state in a corporate form." 37 Colonial Pipeline again
challenged the tax but this time the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the tax. 38 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the
Louisiana decision, focusing on the economic effects of the tax, and noting
that the controlling test was whether the state has exerted its power in
proper proportion to appellant's "enjoyment of the opportunities and pro-
tections which the state has afforded.. .." 39 The Court distinguished Spector
on the narrow ground that Spector had involved a tax on the privilege of
carrying on interstate commerce whereas the Louisiana tax was related only
to the company's activities within the state in the corporate form. 4 °
Justice Blackmun, although concurring in the decision, found Spector
and Colonial essentially irreconcilable and dependent on distinctions far too
fine to be readily understood by taxpayers or even lawyers attempting to
draft constitutional taxing statutes.'" Thus he declared that "[t]he Court
should face the issue and make the choice ... [preferably] against Spec-
for." 42
32 430 U.S. at 286.
33 421 U.S. 100 (1975).
" ld. at 102.
35 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-601 (West 1958).
3° Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Mouton, 228 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 1969), writ denied, '255 La.
474, 231 So. 2d 393 (1970).
32 421 U.S. at 103.
" Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Agerton, 289 So. 2d 93, 101 (La. 1974).
32
 421 U.S. at 109, citing General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436. 440-41
(1964).
'O 421 U.S. at 112-14.
4 Id. at 114. For the criticisms of the scholars on the reigning confusion over state taxa-
tion of intersate commerce, see Barret, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce -"Direct Burdens",
"Multiple Burdens", or What Have You? 4 VAND. L. REv. 496, 515-29 (1951); Hartman, Stale Tax-
ation of Interstate Commerce: A Survey and Appraisal, 46 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1082-86 (1960);
Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: An Appraisal and Suggested Approach, 1953 WASH.
U.L.Q. '233 (1953); Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court, 1974
Term, Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62 VA. L. REv. 149, 177-88 (1975); Note,
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Roadway Express, the Diminishing Privilege Tax Immunity,
and the Movement Toward Uniformity in Apportionment, 36 U. Ctn. L. REV. 186, 187-88 (1961);
Note, Pipelines, Privileges and Labels: Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 70 N.W.U.L. REv. 835,
845-55 (1976).
For the judiciary's confusion over the Supreme Court's position on state taxation of in-
terstate commerce, see, e.g., Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946) ("The history of this
problem is spread over hundreds of volumes of our Reports. To attempt to harmonize all that
has been said in the past would neither clarify what has gone before nor guide the future,");
Roy Stone Transfer Corp. v. Messner, 377 Pa. 243, 244, 103 A. 2d 700, 705 (1954).
42
 421 U.S. at 114.16 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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II. Complete Auto: THE DEATH OF THE Spector RULE
Because Complete Auto's challenge to the Mississippi taxing statute
was based on a violation of the Spector rule forbidding state taxes on the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, 43 the Supreme Court in Com-
plete Auto was presented with an opportunity to respond to Blackmun's
challenge.
The Complete Auto Court's response, written by Justice Blackmun him-
self, simply recounted the recent history of the Spector rule, pointing out
that its doctrinal basis as well as its practical significance had been eroded."
The Court first noted that the basis of the rule was the "underlying philos-
ophy that interstate commerce should enjoy a[n] ... immunity from state
taxation."45
 The Court then contrasted this view with the approach of West-
ern Live Stock and subsequent cases which, in evaluating a state tax statute,
considered the practical economic consequences of the tax on interstate
businesses. 46 Under this approach, the Court was not concerned with the
"formal language of a tax statute" 42 but instead was concerned that in-
terstate commerce bear its 'just share of the tax burden."'"
In addition to announcing its preference for the pragmatic analysis of
Western Live Stock, the Court indicated two ways in which the operation of
the Spector rule had been unsatisfactory. First, the Court noted that the rule
ignored the practical effect of the tax and focused exclusively on the for-
mal language of the taxing statute, striking down only those "in which 'the
incidence' of the tax is the 'privilege of doing business.' "49 Second, when
state taxing statutes involving interstate commerce avoided a particular
phraseology, the Supreme Court in cases subsequent to Spector had
eschewed the Spector rule and actually had employed a practical analysis
similar to the one advanced in Western Live Stock to assess the constitutional-
ity of the statute. 5° The existence of the anomolous Spector rule, the Com-
plete Auto Court explained, had merely prevented an extension of this prac-
tical analysis to state statutes taxing interstate businesses for the privilege of
doing business within the state. 5 ' Thus the Court believed that post-Spector
case law had demonstrated not only that the Spector rule was at odds with
the modern practical outlook of the Court but also that it had actually lost
its effectiveness as anything more than "a rule of draftsmanship." 52 Accord-
ingly, the Court made the choice in favor of extending the practical
analysis to privilege taxes and consequently overruled Spector." Because
Complete Auto's only objection to the Mississippi tax had been that it vio-
lated the Spector rule, the Supreme Court affirmed the Mississippi decision
and upheld the tax.
43 430 U.S. at 278-79, 287.
" Id. at 285.
"Id. at 278, citing Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
" 430 U.S. at 279 n.8.
47 Id. at 279.
"Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 254.
" 430 U.S. at 278.
"Id. at 279.
31 Id.
"430 U.S. at 281.
"Id. at 288-89.
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III. THE FOUR-PART TEST OUTLINED IN Complete Auto
The Complete Auto opinion, while lifting the formal barriers to state
taxation of interstate commerce, does not grant the states free reign to op-
press interstate commerce. On the contrary, in line with the reasoning of
Western Live Stock, the Court indicated that under the commerce clause,
states cannot excessively burden interstate commerce with cumulative taxes
or discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of local trade.54 In ac-
cordance with these principles, the Complete Auto Court indicated that the
constitutionality of state taxes on interstate commerce should be evaluated
by application of a four-part test." In order to be constitutionally valid
under this test, a state tax must be applied to an activity that has a substan-
tial nexus with the taxing state; must not discriminate against. interstate
commerce; must be fairly apportioned; and must be fairly related to the
services provided by the state."
This test does not represent an innovation of the Complete Auto Court;
rather it is derived from an amalgam of prior decisions on state taxing
statutes." Each of the four criteria have their own particular constitutional
and judicial foundations. Each of these requirements will be discussed in
turn.
The first requirement, that there must be a substantial nexus between
the activity taxed and the taxing state, is not grounded in the commerce
clause but rather in the due process clause of the fourteenth arnendtnent. 58
The constitutional rationale for this nexus requirement is that if, under our
federal system a state were to tax interstate activities occurring wholly out-
side its borders and hence outside its jurisdiction, the state would be taking
property without due process of law."
A line of Supreme Court cases has attenuated this clue process
"nexus" requirement by lessening the extent of the connection required be-
tween a particular activity and a given state in order to render that activity
so ld.  at 279.
55 Although this test was enunciated in the context of a decision concerning a state tax
on the privilege of doing interstate business, the Complete Auto Court gave no indication that
the application of this test is to be confined to the privilege tax area. The Court explained that
this kind of practical analysis has been applied by the Supreme Court over the years in ap-
proving many types of state taxes on interstate business. Id. at 279. Moreover, the Court cited
a number of cases which did not concern privilege taxes as authority for this test, id. at 278 n.
6, 279 n. 8, indicating that the Court views this test as a proper approach to assessing the con-
stitutionality of all state taxes affecting interstate commerce.
"Id. at 277-78, 279, 287.
" See, e.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v, Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452
(1959); Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 96-7 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concur-
ring); Freeman v. Hewitt 329 U.S. 249, 271, 276-77 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
"See Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937) where the Court
stated: "[The] State may not tax real property or tangible personal property lying outside her
borders; nor may she lay an excise or privilege tax upon the exercise or enjoyment of a right
or privilege in another State derived from the laws of that State and therein exercised and en-
joyed."Id, at 424.
" See, e.g., Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1953) ("113lue process
requires some definite link, some minimum connection, between a State and the person;
property or transaction it seeks to tax."); International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treas-
ury, 322 U.S. 340, 351-57 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
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taxable by the state." The most recent of these cases preceding Complete
Auto was Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue." In that case, a
Pennsylvania manufacturer challenged the constitutionality of the Washing-
ton business and occupation tax which was levied on the gross receipts
from the sales of goods in the State of Washington. 62 The taxpayer pointed
out that it had only one employee in the state, an engineer whose office
was in his Washington home. The primary responsibility of this employee
was to consult with the Washington-based customer regarding its anti-
cipated needs for the taxpayer's product; but he did not take any purchase
orders from the customer." Despite the absence of a direct relationship be-
tween the engineer's duties and the taxpayer's interstate sales in Washing-
ton, the Court found the taxpayer's business activities in Washington suffi-
cient to sustain the tax."
This trend toward lessening the "nexus" requirement, typified by the
Pressed Steel case, continued in National Geographic Society v. California Board
of Equalization," a decision rendered shortly after Complete Auto. In National
Geographic, the Court held that the continuous presence in California of
two Society offices provided a sufficient "nexus" between the Society and
the state to justify imposition of a tax on the Society's mail order sales from
the District of Columbia to California residents. The fact that the offices'
activities were unrelated to the Society's mail order business initiated en-
tirely in Washington, D.C." did not persuade the Court that the "nexus"
was too thin. Viewed together, then, Pressed Steel and National Geographic
imply that while the "nexus" requirement remains operative, it is being
minimized thereby increasing the states' jurisdiction to tax." The increase
" See, e.g., National Geographic Soc. v. California Board of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551
(1977); General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964); Norton Co. v. Department
of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney,. 311 U.S. 435 (1940). See also
Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court, 1974 Term: Standard
Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62 VA. L. Rev. 149 (1975).
61 419 U.S. 560 (1975).
"Id. at 561-62.
as
	 at 561.
"Id, at 563-64, citing General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 447 (1964)
where the Court upheld a similar tax because the taxpayer's activities within the state were ex-
tensive and included solicitation of sales.
63
 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
56 1d. at 560-61.
" The concept of state jurisdiction to tax is closely analogous to the concept of personal
judicial jurisdiction over individuals and corporations, the parameters of which are also set by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722
(1877). Both the concept of personal judicial jurisdiction and the concept of jurisdiction to tax
are concerned with the limits on the reach of individual state sovereignty within our federal
system. The standards for each of these kinds of state jurisdiction have had a similar de-
velopment. At present, personal judicial jurisdiction can be obtained only over a defendant
who has "certain minimum contacts" with the forum state, International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310, 326 (1945), so as to make the requirement of defending a suit in that state
"reasonable in the context of our federal system of government." Id. at 317. See also Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250 (1957) where the Court stated that "... it is a mistake to assume
that Ethel trend [of expanding personal jurisdiction over nonresidents] heralds the eventual
demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts... [These restrictions)
are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States." For a thor-
ough review of the Supreme Court case law on judicial jurisdiction see Shaffer v. Heitner,
—U.S.—, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2576-87 (1977).
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in state sovereignty which is represented by this lessening of the nexus re-
quirement" is consistent with the view of constitutional federalism reflected
by the Complete Auto decision—that the states have the power to require in-
terstate businesses to pay for benefits and services they receive from the
individual states.
The second requirement outlined by the Complete Auto Court for sus-
taining the validity of a state tax imposed on interstate commerce is that
the tax must be fairly apportioned to the activity carried on within the tax-
ing state. This test was advocated by the Court in Western Live Stock" which
drew on several older cases in concluding that "itjaxation measured by
gross receipts from interstate commerce has been sustained when fairly ap-
portioned to the commerce carried on within the taxing state ... and in
other cases has been rejected because the apportionment was found to be
inadequate or unfair."" A fairly apportioned tax is one which is applied
only to the percentage of a business's activities which occurs within the tax-
ing state." When an interstate business' tax base is apportioned properly,
each state will receive its fair share of interstate business tax revenues with-
out subjecting the business to multiple tax burdens." The proper appor-
tionment formula precludes any given state from taxing that particular
share of taxed interstate revenue which is attributable to any other state. 73
Therefore, the apportionment requirement reflects the view that while the
individual states have the power to tax the operation of interstate busi-
" See National Geographic, 430 U.S. at 562.63 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice
131ackmun points out that National Geographic is in fact a departure from the more stringent
"nexus" requirement in Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
In light of these recent developments the states can be expected to test the limits of this
requirement. For example, the nexus requirement probably will remain an effective limitation
on the reach of the state taxing power in the interstate mail order sates cases. The Court in
National Geographic established that a state does not have jurisdiction to tax an out-of-state mail
order business whose only contact with the state is mail order sales. 430 U.S. at 559. However,
it appears that the states may be able to extend further their taxing power over sales of out-
of-state goods which are transported into the taxing State either by the seller's carrier or by
common carrier. The act of transporting the goods into a given state may constitute a suffi-
cient nexus with the state to satisfy the due process requirement for a sales tax on such goods.
See id. at 562-63 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
DD 309 U.S. at 256. See also Spector Motor Services Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 610
(1951) (Clark, J., dissenting); Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 96-7 (1948)
(Rutledge, J., concurring).
TD 303 U.S. at 256.
" For an example of an apportionment scheme which was approved by the Supreme
Court, see Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 453-54
(1959). Minnesota had used three ratios to arrive at the fraction of net income taxable under
its laws: I) the ratio of the taxpayer's sales assignable to Minnesota during the year to its total
sales made everywhere during that year; 2) the ratio of the taxpayer's total tangible property
in Minnesota for the year to its total tangible property used in business that year wherever
situated: 3) the ratio of the taxpayer's total payroll in Minnesota for the year to its total payroll
for its entire business in the like period. MINN. STAT. § 290.19 (1945).
For an example of an apportionment scheme which was invalidated by the Court, see
Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Comm., 390 U.S. 317 (1968) (Missouri statute
measuring value of railroad's rolling stock, for purposes of taxation by the suite, according to
the ratio of miles operated in Missouri to the railroad's total road mileage held to result in an
assessment which grossly exceeded the value of taxpayer's rolling stock in Missouri, in viola-
tion of the due process and commerce clauses).
72 See Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 256.
12
 See Standard Pressed Steel, 419 U.S. at 564.
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nesses, the commerce clause requires that these businesses be protected
from economic disadvantages which could result solely because they oper-
ate in more than one state.
The third requisite for sustaining the constitutionality of a state tax
imposed on interstate commerce is that it must not discriminate against in-
terstate commerce in favor of local trade. This prohibition on discrimina-
tion has been such a constant throughout the history of commerce clause
litigation that the Supreme Court has recently characterized it as one of the
"firm peaks of decision which remain unquestioned."'" Discrimination in
this context refers to any means by which a state may attempt to give a
competitive advantage to local business relative to interstate business."
Hence, a statute which effectively places different burdens upon interstate
and local trade is unconstitutional. This is so whether these different bur-
dens appear on the face of the statute or whether the statute purports to
treat equally local and interstate commerce but in actual operation puts' in-
terstate commerce at a competitive disadvantage."
The most recent pronoucement of the theory behind the non-
discrimination stricture was made in the Supreme Court's 1977 decision in
Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Cornmission. 77 In that case, the Court in-
validated a New York statute providing for a higher tax rate on transac-
tions involving an out-of-state sale of securities than on most transactions
involving an in-state sale. The Court explained the constitutional rationale
for the decision as follows: "Permitting the individual states to enact laws
that favor local enterprises at the expense of out-of-state business 'would
invite a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive' of the free
trade which the Commerce Clause protects.""
The rationale employed by the Court in invalidating the tax involved
in Boston Stock Exchange underscores the importance of maintaining this
prohibition on discrimination in light of the relaxation of other constitu-
tional limitations on the states' power to tax interstate commerce. If the
states are to co-exist within a mature federal system in which their power to
tax interstate commerce is recognized, then the need for national economic
unity dictates that the commerce clause be read to prohibit the several
states from favoring local businesses at the expense of interstate com-
merce. 79
" Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm., 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977).
"Id. A primitive method of discrimination was to make the tax applicable only to in-
terstate business, exempting local goods or activities. See, e.g., 1.M. Darrell & Son Co. v. Mem-
phis, 208 U.S. 113, 113 (1908). Another type of unconstitutional discrimination involves apply-
ing a higher rate of taxation to out-of-state businesses than to domestic businesses. See, e.g.,
Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaners, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389, 394-95 (1952) (unlicensed
out-of-state laundry was taxed fifty dollars per truck for the privilege of conducting intrastate
activities whereas laundries licensed in the state were taxed only eight dollars per truck).
"See generally Developments in the Law—State Taxation, 75 HARV, L. REV. 953, 962-64
(1962).
" 429 U.S. 31 (1977).
78 1d. at 329, citing Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951).
" The elimination of interstate trade barriers and economic warfare between the states
was one of the main reasons for the abandonment of the Articles of Confederation and the
adoption of the federal Constitution which granted to Congress the power to control interstate
commerce. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, 10, 11 (1824).
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The final requirement set forth by the Complete Auto Court for sustain-
ing a state tax imposed upon interstate commerce is that the tax must be
"fairly related to the services provided by the taxing State."" The Supreme
Court has alluded to this requirement in several recent cases other than
Complete Auto. However, since the fair relationship test was not actually
applied in any of these cases, its function and scope remain unclear." An
examination of the Supreme Court's traditional treatment of state taxes for
the use of public facilities provides some insight into the potential opera-
tion of the fair relationship test. The Court has long recognized that the
states must be allowed to exact reasonable fees from both local and in-
terstate businesses which use facilities provided by the states such as high-
ways" and airports. 83 The amount of such "use taxes" is limited by the
commerce clause to that which is necessary to compensate the state for the
benefits it provides to interstate businesses." The recent Supreme Court
case of Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,"
demonstratcs this principle. in Evansville, the Court stated that a use tax
for the use of an airport must not be "excessive in comparison with the
governmental benefit conferred." 88 The Evansville Airport Authority taxed
8°
 Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 277-78, 279, 287,
8 ' See, e.g., National Geographic Soc. v. California Board of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551,
558 (1977); Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560, 562 (1974);
Wisconsin v. j.C. Penney, 311 U.S. 435,444 (1940).
These cases actually concerned the issue of whether the corporation which was being
subjected to taxation was engaged in activities which had a sufficient connection with the tax-
ing state to satisfy the due process clause. The Court, however, often has blurred the distinc-
tion between the "nexus" requirement and the requirement that the tax he fairly related to the
benefits and services provided by the taxing state. This confusion was demonstrated in f. C.
Penney where the Court made the following statement:
ITJhe sole constitutional test for a case like the present one, • . is whether prop-
erty was taken without due process of law or, if' paraphrase we must, whether the
taxing power exerted by the State bears fiscal relation to protection, opportuni-
ties and benefits given by the State ... the fact that a tax is contingent upon
events brought to pass without a State does not destroy the "nexus" between such
a tax and transactions within a State for which the tax is an exaction.
311 U.S. at 444-45.
In contrast, the Court in the Complete Auto case has taken care to separate the nexus re-
quirement and the "fair relationship" requirement and to state them distinctly, even though
the Complete Auto case itself did not involve a challenge to the Mississippi tax on either "nexus"
or "fair relationship" grounds. 430 U.S. at 287. The Court's separate delineation of the fair re-
lationship requirement is an indication that in future cases the facts which demonstrate a
nexus between the taxing state and the interstate business sufficient to satisfy the due process
requirement will not necessarily demonstrate that the taxing state renders services to the busi-
ness which can serve fairly as a quid pro quo for the tax levied on that business. Instead, the
fair relationship test probably will operate independently and a challenger of a state tax
should he given the opportunity to prove to the Court that the tax is excessive in comparison
with the governmental benefit. conferred.
"Set, e.g., Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950); Hendrick v. Mary-
land, 235 U.S. 610 (1915); Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543 (1886).
" 3 See, e.g., Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. District v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405
U.S. 707 (1972).
"See, e.g., tingles v. Mori', 300 U.S. 290, 294 (1937); Mort' v. Bingham, 298 U.S. 407,
410 (1936); Interstate Transit Inc. v. Lindsay, 283 U.S. 183, 185-86 (1931),
85
 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
" ld. at 717. At a later point in Evansville the Court states "... the airlines [taxpayers]
have not shown these fees to be excessive in relation to costs incurred by the taxing authorities."
id. at 719 (emphasis added). Thus the Court is ambiguous as to whether the reasonableness of
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airlines one dollar per person emplaning commercial aircraft and used the
tax revenue for the maintenance and improvement of the airport." In
evaluating the constitutionality of this tax the Court examined evidence
which indicated that the tax was needed to supplement operating revenues
utilized for capital improvements at the airport. On the basis of this evi-
dence, the Court concluded that the tax was not excessive in comparison
with the governmental benefit conferred."
The Court's application of this "governmental benefits" test in the
Evansville case indicates that it will assess the facts to determine whether a
state use tax upon air carriers is excessive in relation to the benefits con-
ferred. Because of the similarity between this governmental benefits test
and the fair relationship test enunciated in Complete Auto and because of the
essential similarity between a use tax for the use of facilities provided by
the state and a privilege tax for the privilege of using the facilities, the
same type of factual inquiry 89 probably will be extended in future cases to
the Court's evaluation of state taxes on the privilege of engaging in in-
terstate commerce. Hence it appears that the Court will balance the amount
of the tax" on an interstate business against the benefit conferred upon
the business by the taxing state to determine whether the tax is a permissi-
ble exaction under the commerce clause. Such a balancing approach is con-
sistent with the Complete Auto Court's rejection of the per se approach to as-
sessing the constitutionality of state taxes on the privilege of doing business
in interstate commerce which had been prevalent in prior decisions such as
Freeman and Spector."
In view of the removal of the privilege tax immunity the states can be
expected to test the limits of their taxing power by increasing the amounts
of taxes levied on interstate businesses. In future challenges to these taxes
the Supreme Court through the application of the Complete Auto test will be
able to evaluate the validity of the taxes under the commerce clause on a
case by case basis. In using this approach, the Court will be focusing on the
actual effects of a tax on interstate commerce as compared with the practi-
cal needs of the taxing state."
the amount of a tax is to be determined in relationship to the value of the benefit conferred
on the taxpayer by the taxing authority or in relationship to the costs incurred by the state in
providing the benefit.
The Complete Auto opinion unfortunately perpetuates this ambiguity. On one hand, the
Complete Auto Court states that the tax should be "fairly related to the services provided by the
State." 430 U.S. at 279. This language seems to imply that the relevant consideration is the
cost incurred by the taxing state. On the other hand, the Court also states that a tax should be
"fairly related to benefits provided the taxpayer," id. at 287, implying that the relevant consid-
eration is the value of the benefit conferred on the taxpayer. Since no "fair relationship" issue
was actually before the Court in COmplete Auto the clarification of this ambiguity must await fu-
ture application of the test.
" 7 The Court in Evansville also upheld a similar New Hampshire tax. See Northeast Air-
lines, Inc. v. New Hampshire Aeronautics Comm., 111  N.H. 5, 273 A. 2d 676 (1971), consoli-
dated and offd, Evansville, 405 U.S. at 711.
18 405 U.S. at 717-20.
"" See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770 (1945) ("State laws will not be in-
validated without the support of relevant factual material which will 'afford a sure basis' for an
informed judgement.").
9° It should be noted that the due process clause ordinarily does not limit the amount of
a state tax unless the tax is found to be a confiscation of property. See A. Magnano Co. v.
Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 (1934).
9'
	
430 U.S. at 288.
" See id. at 288 n. 15.	 324
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IV. THE BALANCE OF FEDERAL AND STATE POWERS UNDER THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE
Since Complete Auto has shifted the focus of the examination of state
taxes on interstate commerce from a per se approach to a balancing ap-
proach, the law respecting commerce clause limitations applicable to state
tax schemes is now consistent with the approach employed by the Court in
determining the validity of state statutes regulating interstate commerce. 93
In assessing the constitutionality of state regulatory statutes the Supreme
Court first determines if Congress has acted to preclude the states from
regulating the particular aspect of- commerce which the state statute af-
fects." If Congress has not so acted, the Court employs a "balancing ap-
proach" in which it balances the burdens on interstate commerce caused by
the regulation against the benefit that actually accrues to the state. 95
These doctrinal developments, however, were not generally applied in
the field of state taxation of interstate commerce, particularly with respect
to privilege taxes. Although state regulatory statutes affecting interstate
commerce were permitted if not excessively burdensome or preempted by
Congressional regulation, state tax statutes affecting the privilege of doing
interstate commerce were not subjected to a similar analysis. This analytical
inconsistency resulted from conflicting theories. On one hand, the concur-
rent power of the states to tax along with the federal government was
thought to be indispensable to the states' existence within the federal sys-
tem." On the other hand, it was early established that the power to tax is
capable of destroying interstate commerce," necessitating that the federal
" In the historic case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 143 (1851) the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute which required ships
coming into Pennsylvania harbors to utilize a local pilot. The majority of the Court found that
this assertion by the state of power over navigation constituted a regulation of interstate com-
merce. Nevertheless, the Court upheld the statute, thereby clearly establishing that the federal
commerce power is not absolutely exclusive of any state power to regulate interstate cont.
merce. Id. at 151-52.
" See id. at. 153 ("Wintil Congress should find it necessary to exert its commerce power,
it should be left to the states."),
" See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). The Court in Pike suc-
cinctly explained the general rule for determining the validity of state regulatory statutes af-
fecting interstate commerce:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be up-
held unless the but-den imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits. if a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be toler-
ated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on state activities ...
[T]he Court has candidly undertaken a balancing approach in resolving these is-
sues
Id. at 142 (citations omitted),
See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 804 (1976); Great A. & P, Tea Co.
v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 376 (1976); Allenburg Cotton Co., Inc. v, Pittman, 419 U.S. 20,
38-39 (1974) (Rehnquist,., dissenting); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
9e
	v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 10 (1824). See Spector, 348 U.S. at 608.
" McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819). Accord, Freeman v.
Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946).
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privilege of carrying on exclusively interstate commerce be free from state
taxation." The inherent conflict between these two concepts has made it
difficult for the Supreme Court to reconcile the state taxing power with the
implicit limitations upon that power imposed by the federal commerce
clause."
The results of recent cases such as Colonial Pipeline, in which the
Court applied a practical analysis, '°° evince a recognition on the part of
the Court that state taxing power should be treated similarly to state reg-
ulatory power under the commerce clause.'°' Only the archaic privilege
tax immunity has impeded the Court's development of a unitary theory of
state and federal power under the commerce clause in recent years. Com-
plete Auto, by bringing the analysis of state privilege taxes into line with the
analysis of state regulatory statutes, has eliminated the final remnant of the
archaic dictum that "the power to tax is the power to destroy." 102 In so do-
ing, the Supreme Court has suggested a mode of analysis consonant with
the Court's perception of constitutional federalism as a balancing approach
to the co-existence of the state and federal governments.' 03 The approach
suggested in Complete Auto balances the competing interests of the federal
government in maintaining its exdusive power over interstate commerce
and of the states in collecting taxes from interstate commerce in order to
meet fiscal requirements.
The conception of constitutional federalism that underlies the present
extension to the states of the power to tax the privilege of engaging in in-
terstate commerce is one which evinces a greater sensitivity to the legitimate
interests of the state governments. This increased recognition of state
sovereignty is not surprising when viewed in the light of the recent land-
mark decision of National League of Cities v. Usery. 1 " The Supreme Court in
98 Spector, 340 U.S. at 610.
9° See Freeman, 329 U.S. at 251.
'°° See text at notes 32-43 supra.
101 The restrictive approach to state tax statutes is based on the premise that tax statutes
are likely to have a greater adverse effect upon interstate commerce than would regulatory
statutes and, therefore, the states should be prohibited from taxing interstate commerce.
Freeman, 329 U.S. at 253. Although this premise was founded upon Chief Justice Marshall's
view of the destructive power of state taxation in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 431 1819), the Complete Auto decision evinces a recognition that the Supreme Court is
capable of checking that destructive power short of absolutely prohibiting it.
Justice Holmes in a famous dissent in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218 (1928),
foreshadowed the result in Complete Auto when he declared:
It seems to me that the State Court was right [in upholding a Mississippi tax on
the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce in the state]. I should say plainly
right, but for the effect of certain dicta of Chief Justice Marshall which culmi-
nated in or rather were founded upon his often quoted proposition that the
power to tax is the power to destroy. In those days it was not recognized as it is
today that most of the distinctions of the law are distinctions of degree. If the
states had any power it was assumed that they had all power, and that the neces-
sary alternative was to deny it altogether. But this Court which so often has de-
feated the attempt to tax in certain ways can defeat an attempt to discriminate or
otherwise go too far without wholly abolishing the power to tax. The power to
tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits.
Id. at 233.
1 ° 2 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
See Constitutional Federalism, supra note 12, at 780-81.
H" 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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National League of Cities struck down an amendment to the Fair Labor
Standards Act which would have regulated the wages and hours of almost
all state and municipal employees.'" The Court stated that the federal
government must not be permitted through the active exercise of federal
commerce regulations to displace "the states' freedom to structure integral
operation in areas of traditional governmental functions."'°°. National
League of Cities indicates that the Court will test the validity of a federal
regulation found to interfere with traditional state governmental functions
by balancing the importance of the federal interest which the regulation
promotes against the nature and degree of impact which it has upon the
states' interests.' 07
Although the Complete Auto Court was concerned with the limits of
state power under the commerce clause and National League of Cities con-
cerned the limits of federal power under that same clause, the balancing
approach suggested in Complete Auto appears to be consistent with the gen-
eral tenets of federalism enunciated in National League of Cities. "8 This con-
sistency is apparent in Complete Auto since the Complete Auto Court, while rec-
ognizing the states' right to tax the privilege of doing interstate business,
does not ignore the interests of the federal government in protecting in-
terstate commerce. Rather, the Court places restraints upon the states'
power to tax the privilege of doing interstate commerce in the form of the
four-part test which limits the ability of the states to disrupt excessively the
smooth flow of national commerce.'" This test, which is based upon eco-
nomic realities rather than upon formal or semantic precepts, permits the
Court to examine the actual economic effects of any tax that is being chal-
lenged and should allow the Court, as the final arbiter, to continue to hold
the balance between the interests of the state and Federal governments."°
The Complete Auto Court, by replacing the per se rule against state
privilege taxes on interstate commerce with a balancing approach, has
1 Q5 1d. at 836.
mn 1d. at 852. In striking down the amendments, the Court declared that the federal
government cannot overreach the bounds of federalism by employing the commerce clause to
"devour the essentials of state sovereignty." Id. at 855, quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.
183. 205 (1968) (Douglas, j., dissenting). More specifically, the Court stated that Congress is
not permitted to abrogate the states' power over " 'functions essential to the separate and in-
dependent existence of the states.' " 426 U.S. at 845, quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559,
580 (1911).
"7 See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, j., concurring); id. at 872
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Constitutional Federalism, supra note 12, at 778-82.
"" See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), wherein the Court stated:
What the concept [of Federalism] does present is sensitivity to the legitimate in-
terests of both state and national governments, and in which the national gov-
ernment, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and
federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere
with the legitimate activities of the states.
Id. at 44.
"t' See text at notes 55-90 supra.
r" One of the salutary effects of the Complete Auto decision should be that interstate
commerce now will not enjoy any special tax immunity which would make local industry suffer
a competitive disadvantage. See International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322
U.S. 340, 349 (1944) where the Court recognized the necessity of equal tax treatment for local
and interstate businesses.
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taken the step of establishing a new conceptual framework for its decisions
on state taxation of interstate commerce. The Complete Auto Court has
explicitly overruled the doctrine of the Spector case in a unanimous deci-
sion,'" thereby implicitly rejecting the absolute immunity philosophy. 1 12
The historical tension between the constitutional theory that interstate
commerce enjoys an absolute immunity from state taxation and the practi-
cal policy that interstate businesses should bear their just share of the tax
burden now has been resolved fully by the elimination of the privilege tax
immunity—the last vestige of the original absolute immunity theory. As a
result the Supreme Court will no longer have to reconcile any state tax
which reaches revenues from interstate commerce with the doctrine that
the commerce clause requires an absolute immunity of interstate commerce
from state taxation. For these reasons the Complete Auto decision stands on a
firmer conceptual basis than previous cases such as Western Live Stock in
which the Court had given effect to the power of a state to tax interstate
commerce. The consistency of this new conceptual framework established
in Complete Auto with the Court's historical approach toward commerce
clause limitations on state regulatory statutes" 3 and with the Court's recent
pronouncements on constitutional federalism"; indicates that the Court
should not deviate from these concepts in the foreseeable future.
CONCLUSION
In holding that a state may tax the privilege of engaging in interstate
commerce the Court in Complete Auto has abandoned the archaic per se ap-
proach to the assessment of such taxes and has replaced that approach with
a pragmatic four-part test. By repudiating eroded constitutional dogma
concerning the immunity of interstate commerce from state taxation the
Court has clarified its position with respect to all state taxes on interstate
business. The Court's approach to such state taxes is now consistent with
the traditional balancing approach to state regulation of interstate com-
merce. In sum, Complete Auto should result in greater predictability, more
forthright reasoning and a de-emphasis of restrictive formalistic rules as a
controlling factor in the Court's decisions on the propriety of state taxing
statutes affecting interstate commerce. In future challenges to such statutes,
the Court should evaluate the practical effects of the tax in order to main-
tain the delicate balance between competing national and state interests in a
way that comports with the Court's current perception of constitutional
federalism.
BRANDON F. WHITE
'" Complete Auto, 930 U.S. at 288-89.
" 2 1d. at 288 n.15.
13
 See text at notes 93-103 supra.
`" See text at notes 104-107 supra.
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